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Consent, Dissent, 
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Franco-German Defense  
Industrial Cooperation
Defense industrial cooperation between Germany and France is 
beset by difficulties. In a series of interviews, government and 
industrial stakeholders from both countries have described the 
differences and misperceptions concerning the strategic political 
framework, defense exports, and defense industrial policies. These 
interviews have resulted in a problem landscape which can help 
stakeholders find solutions.
 – Areas of consent: Germany and France especially agree on mea-
sures and projects that need to be done in the future.  
Stakeholders need to actively keep this consensus alive as it is 
not a given.
 – Areas of dissent: Where France and Germany have differences 
about threat perceptions, ways to define capabilities, and pro-
curement projects, they mostly agree to disagree.  
To move forward, they need to aim for a balanced and sustain-
able compromise.
 –  Areas of misperception: This is the most difficult and most 
frequently occurring category: talking at cross purposes. To 
mitigate mistrust and frustration, stakeholders have to define 
problems jointly, prioritize them, and agree on the ways they 
want to work on solutions.
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Germany and France are embarking on a new era of 
defense industrial cooperation. If this cooperation 
succeeds, it will shape the overall European tech-
nological and industrial landscape and serve as a 
point of crystallization for defense industrial coop-
eration across the continent. This structuring effect 
results from the unprecedented amount of resourc-
es that the two countries aim to invest: more than 
100 billion euros over the next decades. With this 
investment, the two countries and the companies 
involved will develop new technologies and weap-
on systems and influence industrial relations with-
in Europe and beyond.
Yet for decades, cooperation between the two 
countries has been chronically cumbersome. Identi-
fying the problems that have the potential to ham-
per or even prevent a new defense industrial co-
operation among Germany and France is a crucial 
first step toward finding solutions. To measure the 
scope and quality of these problems more precise-
ly, this study maps the perceptions of government 
and industrial stakeholders on the French and Ger-
man sides with regard to three questions: 1) Which 
problems for defense industrial cooperation exist 
on the German side? 2) Which problems for defense 
industrial cooperation exist on the French side? 
3) What could stakeholders contribute to solving 
these problems? 
With the answers to these questions, a landscape 
emerges of shared problem assessments, dissent-
ing views, and misunderstandings, i.e. problems 
that are perceived or framed by one side only. This 
landscape is the base for a potential second phase, 
in which actors could start a moderated discussion 
about the “problem landscape” and what to do to 
ensure sustainable defense industrial cooperation.
THE GERMAN VIEW  
OF PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
German stakeholders think of cooperation prob-
lems mainly in terms of comparing their own 
circumstances to those of their French counter-
parts. They see the French government’s support 
to its industry as a disadvantage because German 
industry does not receive support of this kind or 
magnitude. Given that Germany lacks a defense 
industrial strategy, German actors are also worried 
about the French strategy. They question how the 
French concept of strategic autonomy relates to 
defense industrial cooperation, sharing, and con-
solidation. Furthermore, production in Germany 
and for the German customer has to conform to 
regulations and a procurement process that the 
French industry is not bound to.
At the same time, German stakeholders are con-
scious that several of the problems identified in 
this study result from different approaches to de-
fense policy, capabilities, defense industry, and 
technology. A case in point are defense exports, 
where Germany has often changed its policy rath-
er abruptly due to domestic policy considerations. 
All in all, German stakeholders are not quite as cer-
tain as their French counterparts that their cooper-
ation is necessary for building a common security 
and defense policy and the next generation of ar-
mament systems.
THE FRENCH VIEW OF 
PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
French stakeholders consider that Germany does 
not have the exact same threat assessment and 
therefore may not have the same requirements. In 
their view, Germany’s procurement procedures and 
its management of complex armament programs 
are ill-adapted to deliver the equipment required 
by the armed forces in time. This is partly because 
Germany’s and France’s operational needs do not 
match: The French armed forces have a precise un-
derstanding of their needs because they have com-
bat-proven equipment types, which often define 
what kind of equipment they will require in the fu-
ture. 
France’s defense industrial policy is based on the 
assessment that it is necessary to develop nation-
al and European strategic autonomy. This entails 
being able to develop and control certain technol-
ogies, to benefit from security of supply for those 
that will not be developed domestically, and to 
protect companies from unfriendly foreign invest-
ments. France also considers it necessary to define 
a national position on the future consolidation of 
the European Defense and Technology Industrial 
Base (EDTIB). French stakeholders want Germany 
to draw up its own defense industrial policy, which 
is currently not actively defined by the government 
but developed by German companies by default. 
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MIS(SING) PERCEPTIONS
In France, the reluctance of German companies 
to cooperate with their French counterpart – 
based on the German perception of the French 
government’s influence – is often understood as 
a wish to develop a national industry in Germany 
instead of consolidating the EDTIB. Problems 
arise in three areas: the political strategic 
framework, defense exports, and defense 
industrial policies. In these areas we found three 
categories of problems: German and French 
actors either a) consent to common problem 
perceptions, or b) their perceptions are dissenting 
or c) they have mis(sing) perceptions. With regard 
to the first category (‘consent’), Germany and 
France especially agree on things that need to be 
done in the future. Regarding the second category 
(‘dissent’), while there are not many areas of 
dissent, both sides agree to disagree on important 
issues like threat perceptions, ways to define 
capabilities, and ways to transfer those definitions 
into procurement projects. Once solutions are 
sought, there will likely be more consent. 
The third category – mis(sing) perceptions – is 
possibly the most difficult and at the same time 
the most important and most frequently occurring 
one: Germany and France talk at cross purposes, 
which potentially leads to mistrust and frustration. 
This category is multifaceted. It can just mean that 
more information needs to be included with open 
questions, lest they be answered on the wrong ba-
sis. One example is the fact that the French stake-
holders frequently do not know who the key actors 
and procedures in German capability develop-
ment are. But it can also mean that one side per-
ceives a problem that the other side does not de-
tect. Misperceptions can also mean that a problem 
gets identified in the same area but framed in dif-
ferent ways. A case in point is that neither France 
nor Germany clearly explain the content and ratio-
nale of their defense industrial policy to each other. 
While the French find it difficult to believe that Ger-
many does not have an overall defense industrial 
strategy, German actors believe that France is am-
biguous about whether to aim for national strate-
gic autonomy or for European strategic autonomy.
We see these three categories – consent, dissent 
and misunderstanding – as stages of problem per-
ception as the stakeholders’ readiness to solve the 
problems increases. Accordingly, we sketch out 
three different ways forward, depending on the 
category. For areas of consent: Stakeholders need 
to actively keep the consensus alive as it is not a 
given. For areas of dissent: work on balanced and 
sustainable compromise. In areas of mis(sing) per-
ceptions: Stakeholders need to explain to their 
counterparts those national practices and mean-
ings that are misperceived. To solve problems, 
stakeholders ultimately have to define them joint-
ly, prioritize them, and agree on the ways they want 
to work on solutions. Constant or repeated expla-
nations may be needed, taking into account insti-
tutional turnover. Also, activities have to be in line 
with the explanations to be able to work against 
ambiguities that can lead to distrust.
In line with these general observations, the stake-
holders interviewed and we as authors have sug-
gested some elements of the way forward. These 
comprise: a) a joint approach to armament, pro-
curement, and defense industry; b) initiating one or 
several short-term capability programs to generate 
experiences that would contribute to the success-
ful implementation of the next generation of larg-
er programs; c) mitigating misperceptions and prej-
udices through a joint and constant assessment of 
facts, figures, and foresight and cross-strategizing. 
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INTRODUCTION
In their joint declaration of July 13, 2017, France and 
Germany envisaged to launch a number of joint ini-
tiatives and projects in the defense industrial do-
main. A key element of success will be the smooth 
cooperation between industrial and governmental 
actors on both sides. 
Unfortunately, Franco-German defense industrial 
cooperation has an ambiguous track record. Today, 
actors from both sides perceive cooperation as dif-
ficult to achieve and to sustain. According to them, 
insufficient levels of trust, suspicion about the oth-
er side’s objectives, but also serious differences in 
the respective national systems and approaches, are 
the main reasons for the current problems. Partners 
fear being overtaken or believe that the other gov-
ernment intervenes in favor of its national industries.
However, it is not clear if these problems exist objec-
tively, or if they are simply misunderstandings or the 
result of long held stereotypes about one’s own and 
the other country. As a consequence, it is difficult 
to grasp, verify, and differentiate the problems. Yet 
this is a necessary first step to be able to envisage 
and discuss solutions acceptable to all partners. It is 
remarkable how little has improved in recent years. 
Essentially, the analysis and outline of the problems 
have not changed much over the last decade.
This paper identifies such perceived problems and 
classifies them according to whether they are shared 
or only advanced by one side. The aim is to offer a 
starting point for further discussions and initial rec-
ommendations for solutions.
In strictly off-the-record interviews, industrial and 
governmental actors in Germany and France were 
asked to provide input on three questions:
• Which problems for defense industrial coopera-
tion exist on the German side?
• Which problems for defense industrial coopera-
tion exist on the French side?
• What could you contribute to solving these 
problems? 
The result is a mapping of the perceived problems, 
that is areas where German and French stakehold-
ers either share a common perception of the issues 
at hand, differ in their perceptions, or misperceive 
each other. Potential solutions are also presented. In 
addition, the mapping offers some indications about 
responsibilities, readiness, and ability to solve these 
problems. This mapping process could lead to a sec-
ond phase, in which actors start a moderated dis-
cussion about the “problem landscape” and how to 
engage with it to ensure a sustainable defense indus-
trial cooperation.
THE FRENCH VIEW OF 
PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
French stakeholders consider the Franco-German 
defense industrial cooperation a political and indus-
trial necessity for the future of the European Union 
and the future of CSDP – without prejudice to the 
objective of a “European army.” They see the Fran-
co-British defense cooperation as smoother, given 
some practical aspects like a common military cul-
ture or the similarity of management of armament 
programs – notwithstanding the perceived smaller 
appetite on the UK side for building a common for-
eign and defense policy. Thus, Franco-German coop-
eration is looked at in terms of risk management. 
Different defense policies
France and Germany do not share a common un-
derstanding of security threats. Germany is in-
creasingly aware of the Russian threat, both be-
cause of its geographical position in Europe and 
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because of the threat perception originating with 
its immediate neighbors in the East (Poland) or in 
the Baltic Sea (Sweden, Baltic countries). In the 
French view, the Framework Nation Concept (FNC) 
initiative launched by Germany within the frame-
work of NATO in 2014 aims to pool the capabili-
ties of countries that define their defense essen-
tially based on collective defense within NATO. Yet 
France progressively revised its threat assessment 
of the European territorial security. It increasingly 
sees the necessity to reinforce collective security 
assets and seeks to increase armament coopera-
tion either in the Franco-German context or with-
in the European initiatives aiming at a Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) and the establish-
ment of a European Defense Fund (EDF).
In terms of military requirement, the more equip-
ment is used in combat with a high-risk level for 
soldiers – in general by land forces – the more pre-
cise the specifications of equipment in France, and 
therefore the greater the risk of divergence with 
Germany.
Different ways to define military requirements
In France, the definition of equipment is the subject 
of a very precise and centralized procedure in which 
the military staff (état-major des armées, EMA) – 
who use the equipment – and the directorate gen-
eral of armament (Direction générale de l’armement, 
DGA) – which has knowledge of the technologies 
– are very closely integrated. French methodology 
to develop new equipment is capability-based, ef-
fect-based, and system-of-system driven. More-
over, if French capability planning and the method 
of program development are highly centralized, this 
does not exclude some flexibility in the evolution of 
specifications of the program during the develop-
ment period. 
The French perception is that this methodology for 
developing operational requirements with all the re-
lated process organization does not exist with the 
same scope on the German side. There is also the 
perception that the German system is very rigid at 
the level of the ministry of defense (MoD, in Ger-
man Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – BM-
Vg). This is due to the fact that the Bundestag is in-
volved in the armament approval process, which is 
not the case with the Assemblée Nationale. As a re-
sult, there is a feeling that in Germany, the industri-
al sector has the strongest influence over defining 
military requirement.
Institutional factors related to the organization of 
the ministries of defense and the respective roles 
of the French and German parliaments
The German and French MoDs are not organised in 
the same way. The Bundeswehr inspector general 
(Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr) and the French 
chief of defense staff (chef d’état-major des armées, 
CEMA) do not have the same function. The role of 
the Bundeswehr inspector general in the expres-
sion of military need is much less important than 
the French CEMA.
The German state secretary responsible for arma-
ment and the French DGA do not have the same 
function either. This lack of similarity is an obsta-
cle to Franco-German defense industrial coopera-
tion and is also both the cause and the expression of 
the lack of correlation in the planning methodolo-
gies of the two countries. 
At the higher level of dialogue and coordination, the 
FGDSC, established by the Additional Protocol of 
January 22, 1988, to the Elysée Treaty of January 22, 
1963, remains a consultative body that does not ful-
ly play its role in the definition and the management 
of armament cooperation programs. 
The role of parliament is also slightly different. In 
Germany, all programs over 25 million euros must 
be approved by the Bundestag, a prerogative that 
does not exist in France. Even if the French and 
German parliaments’ arms export control poli-
cies are both based on posteriori control, German 
members of parliament are more involved in the 
definition of arms export policy than their French 
counterparts. In France, it is considered that par-
liamentary control over the launching of an arma-
France and Germany  
do not share a common  
understanding of  
security threats
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ment program can cause delays which could hamper 
its development.
The French perception is also that parliamentary re-
lations in the field of defense involving the defense 
committee of the Bundestag and its counterparts in 
the National Assembly and Senate in France remain 
limited, despite the recent creation of a Franco-Ger-
man Interparliamentary Assembly. Yet these links 
could create a better understanding of the respec-
tive role of the two parliaments to control defense 
governmental policy and a better understanding of 
the perception of Franco-German defense industrial 
cooperation in each country.
Export procedures and policies 
France and Germany do not have the same arms ex-
port policies, and they will need to define rules for 
exporting Franco-German cooperative programs and 
nationally developed programs that include com-
ponents coming from the other country. In France, 
arms export is considered necessary to reduce the 
costs of developing equipment and preserve the 
competitiveness of the defense industry. In contrast 
to Germany, France also has a strategic perception of 
arms exports in terms of influence and security part-
nerships with, for instance, Australia in the Asia Pa-
cific region or Saudi Arabia in the fight against ter-
rorism. In addition, the French point of view is that 
their technical control is very effective, though ex-
ports delays still happen. Moreover, the French con-
sider that at the political level, German export cul-
ture is both more pacifist, linked in particular to 
history, and tied to greater control by the Bundestag. 
There is no criticism of German arms export policy 
by the French public. Yet officials and the French in-
dustry worry about the current difficulties of export-
ing French armaments with German components 
to Gulf countries. They fear economic penalties to 
French companies or worse, the bankruptcy of small 
and medium defense enterprises.
This question has become a strategic issue due to 
the significance of some armament cooperation proj-
ects launched, like the Future Combat Air System 
(FCAS) and the Future Main Ground Combat Sys-
tem (MGCS), and the need to define the prospective 
export framework for this equipment. The Aachen 
Treaty of January 22, 2019, set the general objective 
for jointly  manufactured arms exports. A text defin-
ing the framework for such joint exports was agreed 
by the two countries at the Franco-German summit 
in Toulouse on October 16, 2019. France sees this as 
a great step toward solving the question of exporting 
common equipment program, but it may face signifi-
cant hurdles in implementation.
The defense industry factor
French defense actors have mixed feelings about 
cooperating with Germany. Historically, the Fran-
co-German cooperation is seen as a success story: 
Armament cooperation in the 1960s (Transall air-
craft, Milan missile), the 1980s (Tiger and NH 90 heli-
copter), and 2000s (Airbus A 400 M and Meteor mis-
sile), and the unique merger of two main defense civil 
and military companies, DASA and Aérospatiale/Ma-
tra to create EADS, now Airbus, attest to that. Taking 
into account the necessity to consolidate the Euro-
pean arms industry, the merger of Nexter and Krauss 
Maffei Wegmann in 2014, even though it remains of 
limited practical importance, is also perceived as a 
success.
However, the dialogue with their German counter-
parts always seems difficult to French representa-
tives of the defense industry. Here, the importance 
of cultural differences needs to be taken into ac-
count. They are rooted in the political, social, and 
economic history of each country and difficult to 
change.
The objective of defense industrial policy
France has been pursuing the objective of strategic 
autonomy for nearly 60 years. Even if there is no sin-
gle key document on this matter, French defense in-
dustrial policy consistently points to the need for 
France to act freely in certain circumstances. France 
is now moving more and more from a national notion 
of strategic autonomy to a European notion of stra-
tegic autonomy. For France, the tools of defense in-
dustrial policy are:
- France’s procurement policy, taking into account 
European regulations. The 2017 defense and security 
review explains when European cooperation is seen 
In contrast to Germany, 
France has a strategic  
perception of arms exports
The Problem Landscape of Franco-German Defense Industrial Cooperation
7No. 1 | January 2020
ANALYSIS
as the preferred way to acquire armaments, but also 
when national procurement would be chosen.
- The R&T defense budget which aims at developing 
key defense technologies for the future.
- The capacity to control foreign investment in the 
defense sector and the ability to explain the French 
state’s position in case of a proposed merger of a de-
fense company that is still partly state owned.
French observers, coming from industry and from 
different ministries, do not comment on German 
policy at this level. However, they believe more dia-
logue is needed to be able to concretely explain and 
define the objectives Germany and France can share 
in terms of defense industrial policy.
Mistrust and misunderstanding on Franco-German 
cooperation
French actors tend to have a feeling of superiori-
ty over their Germans counterparts in terms of de-
fining military capabilities and managing equipment 
programs on complex weapons systems as well as 
controlling the technologies used in these systems. 
This assessment is made by the French customer 
side and the French industrial side alike. The French 
perception is that this is based on an objective anal-
ysis. However, the French concede that their feel-
ing of superiority is sometimes overemphasized (this 
self-criticism was put forward by several French ob-
servers). In any case, the view of French superiority 
is obviously not shared with the Germans, for fear of 
creating mistrust between the two countries.
Also, since Germany has developed a high-level, 
globally operating industry, the perception in France 
is that the Germans believe they must have leader-
ship in the entire industrial field, including the de-
fense industry sector. This opinion is also not shared 
by the French with their German counterparts for 
fear of creating mistrust. 
There is also the assessment that cooperation has 
not benefited both countries to the same extent. In 
the past, the cooperation was considered more ad-
vantageous to France, as some French actors recog-
nize. But now there is occasionally the feeling that 
the balance of power is reversed, and that Fran-
co-German cooperation brings fewer benefits to 
France. 
Finally, there is a fear in France of Germany devel-
oping a defense industrial policy, driven by German 
MoD or the German defense industry, that could 
lead to a “renationalization” of the German defense 
industry. Germany’s development of an overlapping 
space industrial capability is often quoted as an ex-
ample for when decisions taken at the political lev-
el lead to duplication rather than to Franco-German 
consolidation.
THE GERMAN VIEW OF 
PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE 
INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
German industry and government officials see sig-
nificant strengths in the existing Franco-German de-
fense industrial cooperation. Working together this 
closely through companies, joint ventures etc. en-
ables both countries to combine their potentials: 
strong industries with sophisticated and innovative 
technologies. Flagship products from several de-
cades include the C-160 Transport plane, the NH-90 
Helicopter, and the A-400M transport plane. Hence, 
experiences from earlier Franco-German coopera-
tion exist that could be analyzed and built upon. 
There is a clear statement of political will: The deci-
sions and resolutions, especially of the Franco-Ger-
man Council of Ministers of 2017, constitute an of-
ficial point of reference to extend and deepen the 
cooperation and to develop projects on a bilateral 
and European basis. 
With this in mind, governments and industries see 
many opportunities in closer Franco-German coop-
eration. The political statements have opened a win-
dow of opportunity – even if recent developments in 
Franco-German relations send more lukewarm sig-
nals. Flagship projects like FCAS and MGCS have a 
long-term character: Many governments and heads 
of state will be coming and going before they are ful-
ly implemented. Past experiences in Franco-Ger-
man as well as in European cooperation can serve 
as blueprints or at least as starting points. Moreover, 
there may be more opportunities for Franco-German 
cooperation as a consequence of Brexit and the cur-
rent and likely future state of transatlantic relations. 
Through more cooperation, and thus new products 
and access to markets, exports could increase. Gov-
ernments and industries could also aim to harmonize 
export regulations, procedures, and assessments to 
ensure a sustainable export practice. In turn, govern-
The Problem Landscape of Franco-German Defense Industrial Cooperation
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ments and industry expect that more closely harmo-
nized export regulations at the European level could 
increase and deepen defense industrial cooperation.
However, both industry and government repre-
sentatives acknowledge severe weaknesses and fu-
ture risks when it comes to Franco-German defense 
industrial cooperation. Many of the weaknesses are 
not new at all. They have resurfaced as a result of 
the intensified discussions about major defense co-
operation projects, both among experts and stake-
holders on the one hand, and in the wider public 
in Germany on the other. Such weaknesses include 
issues of diverging geostrategic priorities, the risk 
of dependencies, and competing industrial interests 
in France or Germany. Many observers in Berlin see 
the lack of commitment to increasing the defense 
budget (the two-percent-debate) and especially the 
German debate over exports (particularly as related 
to the Saudi Arabia / Kashoggi case) as contributing 
to a negative image of Germany in the French pub-
lic and parts of the French administration. German 
players are increasingly determined to express and 
pursue German interests in Franco-German de-
fense cooperation, yet they also worry that France 
might question the sincerity of Germany’s commit-
ment to this cooperation.
Problems for defense industrial cooperation iden-
tified on the German side
Several of the problems identified by German stake-
holders seem to result from the different political 
approaches to defense and the defense industry in 
France and Germany. 
Strategic level differences
The two countries differ in how they approach tech-
nologies and operations but also with regard to fi-
nancial and geographical priorities.
Besides, according to German government and in-
dustry officials, substantial problems persist at the 
strategic level. Germany lacks a strategic ratio-
nale for its defense industry. While documents have 
been issued by the German government, such as the 
2015 strategy paper on strengthening the defense 
industry in Germany,  they have not yet been im-
plemented. As a consequence, the practice of gov-
ernment-industry interaction remains largely un-
changed. Moreover, German stakeholders believe 
that in the relationship, differences are given more 
weight than commonalities. During the Cold War, 
France and Germany ran several cooperative pro-
grams; in post-Cold War times, the underlying sim-
ilarities in assessments and capability needs have 
gradually disappeared. Indeed, differences have pro-
gressively become more important than points of 
convergence. 
Currently discussed bilateral programs have a long-
term perspective (MGCS, FCAS, etc.). The FCAS pro-
gram is a potential game changer at both state and 
industry level, notably because it could be benefit 
from mistakes made and lessons learnt in past co-
operative programs. However, a short-term (smaller) 
program would enable relearning the mechanisms of 
bilateral cooperation.
Missing governmental support to German industry
German actors experience the French approach as 
always well-orchestrated across individual compa-
nies and the administration. Such strong networks 
and the routine to operate within them are missing 
in Germany. German actors feel in danger of being 
overtaken by the French machinery and therefore 
believe they are in a weaker negotiating position. 
Moreover, the German government is rarely willing 
to give top priority to decisions on defense industri-
al topics. Even if such decisions are taken swiftly and 
at the highest level, Germany is unwilling to invest in 
their implementation, e.g. by setting up task forces 
and staffing them appropriately.
While Germany has become better at coordinating 
its stakeholders and at standing up to partners to 
defend its interests, such engagement often depends 
on individual people who are willing to invest the 
time and effort and take the political risk of doing so. 
German standards and bureaucracy
There are cultural and legal limits to closer govern-
ment-industry cooperation in Germany. First, Ger-
Germany lacks a  
strategic rationale for its  
defense industry
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man companies see themselves as economically 
independent entrepreneurs. Second, there are con-
siderable legal limits to cooperation or even coordi-
nation. The MoD’s objective of creating fair condi-
tions for competition has produced a situation where 
companies may actually deny having the competenc-
es and expertise needed by the government. This is 
due to current procurement regulations: If a compa-
ny is involved in the definition phase of a capabili-
ty, it later runs the risk of being excluded from the 
bidding because it has knowledge about the required 
product that could give it an unfair advantage in the 
bidding process.
German companies see themselves at a disadvantage 
in comparison to their French competitors when it 
comes to the production standards and regulations 
they have to take into account. The German pro-
curement system is increasingly constrained by bu-
reaucratic procedures and obligations. For example, 
changes in civil workspace standards affect the de-
sign of military equipment such as tanks as well as 
ships. If the standard size of a crew cabin changes, 
this impacts not only the length and width of a ship 
but also its engine, speed etc. – hence, the whole de-
sign. German tanks have to meet the conditions that 
apply to civilian office or work places: A female gun-
ner has to be able to operate in a tank without any 
impact on her health, even if she is well advanced in 
pregnancy. 
The irony is that even if every rule makes sense indi-
vidually, in the aggregate, it becomes impossible for 
the procurement system to deliver effective defense 
capabilities on time and within the estimated costs. 
The probability that standards change during the 
long production phase of complex systems is high. 
This puts an extra burden on German producers to 
first deliver equipment to the German armed forc-
es, which can then serve as a reference model and 
showcase for other potential buyers/customers.
Export procedures and policies 
German industry and to a certain extent the govern-
ment see their country’s export regulations and ex-
port decisions for defense industrial goods and ser-
vices as a particularly big hurdle to competition and 
cooperation. Germany traditionally has a more risk-
averse approach to defense exports than France. 
This goes hand in hand with a less strategic ap-
proach. German governments have used defense ex-
ports to support national strategic interests related 
to the importing actors only in a few cases. Instead, 
exports have mainly been used as a means to sup-
port national industry. Germany has been primarily 
an economic exporter, less a strategic exporter.
For a long time, the situation was characterized by 
an informal practice of defense export licenses be-
tween German industry and government. The same 
seems to be true for the 1972 Schmidt-Debré agree-
ment for exports of goods that were jointly devel-
oped by Germany and France. Systems produced by 
several nations are covered by MoUs among partici-
pating governments.
This informal practice and the trust that the German 
industry and France had built up as result came to a 
sudden end in 2013, when the political leadership in 
some German ministries started a debate about the 
ramifications of defense exports, essentially aimed at 
reducing the overall volume of German defense ex-
ports. German policy changed from restrictive to un-
reliable in the eyes of many players in Germany and 
beyond. This happened despite early warnings from 
industry of the negative impact this would have on 
German companies’ opportunities to sell goods and 
services abroad and with regard to defense industri-
al cooperation and participation. 
“German-free” became a keyword that encompass-
es the fears of German industry and gives a boost 
to its competitors: The German government put on 
hold virtually every delivery of systems that con-
tained German components. Arms exports that con-
tain components made in Germany have become a 
risk for the ordering country as well as for partner-
ing industries and governments in the production of 
defense goods. 
Based on this experience, industry and some officials 
in the government fear that this new German prac-
tice will put future projects at risk. This is particular-
ly true for systems where there is a political agree-
ment for a joint production with French industries. 
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Which problems for defense industrial 
cooperation exist on the French side,  
according to the Germans?
Implications of “strategic autonomy” 
German officials and industrial decision makers lack 
the certainty of direction that the French govern-
ment offers to industry. They see the French ap-
proach of national strategic autonomy as contradic-
tory to its aim of intensifying defense cooperation. 
German counterparts wonder how these two goals 
can be matched, and what France is really willing to 
give up when it comes to consolidation, what defines 
successful cooperation for France, and which de-
pendencies France can accept. Unfortunately, some 
German stakeholders do not trust France’s official 
response. “We have listened carefully, but we don’t 
believe it,” they say.
There is a second, similar element: Both Germany 
and France aim to retain political, military, and tech-
nological sovereignty. This affects the current and 
future DTIB as well as concrete projects. Both Ger-
many and France wish to use upcoming projects to 
keep their DTIBs alive. Hence, cooperation always 
entails a struggle about the political, military, indus-
trial, and technological dimensions and links them 
to factors of domestic politics, such as safeguarding 
high value jobs. Frequent questions were: What are 
the political guidelines and the ramifications for the 
future DTIB in Germany and France? Will it be de-
signed and managed jointly, or will it be left to indus-
trial and political forces on each side so that it would 
be serving not the common interest but individual 
goals? This issue has to do with trade-offs between 
cooperation, efficiency and consolidation: Especial-
ly industrial production capacities need to operate in 
one country only in order to be efficient which leads 
to fierce competition between countries and makes 
sharing and cooperation more difficult. The situa-
tion is similar when it comes to technology. Intellec-
tual property rights (IPRs) can be shared. Yet IPRs are 
not the only key factor. What matters in a joint ven-
ture or Franco-German company is the location of 
the R & D – where the laboratories are located, and 
thus where the evolution of technology and related 
job growth will happen. 
German industry faces a French government-in-
dustry alliance 
The main criticism is the lack of a level playing field. 
On the industrial side, a main disadvantage Ger-
man companies see is that many French companies 
are state-owned or significantly influenced by the 
French state. German stakeholders assume or have 
experienced that the French government either di-
rectly inf luences operative decisions or at least 
maintains a strong communication channel with 
companies. Most importantly, French companies can 
be and have been backed by state subsidies.
Consequently, German government and industry 
representatives alike paint a critical picture of the 
French side. In many ways, German industry sees it-
self in a defensive position in this competition. The 
most crucial issue is the perceived will and capabil-
ity of the French state to intervene in multination-
al companies and to break international arrange-
ments for the sake of national interests. Here, 
political interference with EADS/Airbus gets 
constantly mentioned. Examples from the civil-
ian realm are also used to support this criticism: 
The cross-border mergers of Rhône-Poulenc-
Hoechst and later Sanofi-Aventis have repercus-
sions to the present day. The French state was 
perceived to intervene although it had promised 
abstention before the merger. From a German 
perspective, this points to the overall (simpli-
fied) difference between France as a state-driv-
en economy with government interference, and 
Germany as a free market economy without di-
rections given by the state. 
There is an economic dimension as well: Ger-
man representatives assume, and some experts can 
give examples to support this assumption, that the 
French government is either willing or forced to sup-
port or even subsidize individual companies due to 
the partly state-controlled ownership structure. 
This is perceived to be the case even when such 
companies are generating products of lower quali-
ty which will not sell on the international market. 
Paris allegedly undermines market-driven solutions 
German government and  
industry representatives alike 
paint a critical picture of the 
French side
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by keeping ineffective industries alive through di-
rect subsidies, as the GIAT/Nexter or DCNS/Naval 
Group show.
Moreover, many German representatives think that 
they face a strong personal network in the French 
administration and industry, a tightly knit group of 
people, who are all working hand in hand to support 
French (industrial) interests and companies. This hi-
erarchical network gives French industry and offi-
cials the ability to quickly communicate their issues 
to higher-ranking political and industrial leaders and 
to gain rapid decisions. At the same time, this system 
also allows the French side to swiftly adopt new di-
rections across all sectors.
CONSENT, DISSENT AND 
MIS(SING) PERCEPTIONS: THE 
PROBLEM LANDSCAPE 
Three major problem areas can be drawn from the 
interviews: 
• The political/strategic framework: the politi-
cal guidelines, capability development, and pro-
curement procedures that generate the ba-
sis and the ramification for defense industrial 
cooperation. 
• Defense export regulations: a straightforward 
topic as both Germany and France are active in 
defense exports and aim to reduce the burden of 
system development and per unit costs by ex-
porting the final product.
• Defense industrial policies: their content and the 
objectives and ways governments act to influ-
ence and shape the defense industry, the DTIB, 
and the interaction of government and indus-
tries. This category also includes perceptions 
about past policies that have shaped the current 
landscape, cooperation experience, and expec-
tations about the future of cooperation.
For the landscaping, we have mapped out be-
low where there is consent on problem percep-
tions, where both sides dissent, and where percep-
tions are missing. While this sounds straightforward, 
some issues are more complex than the matrix im-
plies. We therefore elaborate on them below: 
Consent: Germany and France especially agree on 
shortcomings and on what needs to be done in the 
future. This is positive as it allows both countries to 
build on this consent and define a way forward more 
easily. Main areas are the benefits of Franco-German 
cooperation and the deficits in the German political 
framework, as well as the ambiguity of German ex-
port policy and its consequences.
Dissent: Interestingly, we have not found many ar-
eas of dissent. However, many areas of dissent may 
surface once the work on the third category, that is 
clarifying the mis(sing) perceptions, moves forward. 
Moreover, a closer look at the areas of consent al-
so shows that in some cases, Germany and France 
agree to disagree: Both sides admit that important 
differences exist. In other words, they point to ar-
eas where both sides identify the need to overcome 
dissent and find a consensus. These areas are relat-
ed to the threat perceptions that drive capability de-
mand. Because of them, definitions of requirements 
and specifications for equipment diverge significant-
ly between France and Germany, especially in the ar-
ea of land systems. Both countries also differ in the 
way such capabilities are defined and those defini-
tions are transferred into procurement. Moreover, 
while both sides share the perception of asymmetric 
conditions for bilateral cooperation, they do not have 
the same explanation for this situation.
Mis(sing) perceptions: This is possibly the most dif-
ficult and at the same time the most important cat-
egory, under which we have subsumed three areas 
and issues: First, there are issues that are only per-
ceived as a problem by one side but not detected 
by the other (missing perception). An example for a 
missing perception is that of the CFADS which was 
not even mentioned by German interviewees. They 
have no awareness of it as a relevant body that can 
either create problems or help solve them. Similar-
ly, German actors did not mention the French parlia-
ment as an important actor in this area.
The second category concerns problems that are 
identified in the same area but framed in different 
ways. For instance, neither Germany nor France ex-
plain the content and rationale of their defense in-
dustrial policies clearly to their partner: While the 
French find it difficult to believe that Germany has 
no overall defense industrial strategy, German actors 
have a perception of ambiguity in France where the 
relationship between national strategic autonomy 
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Only through cooperation will Germany and France 
be able to effectively pursue their interests. This is 
true for specific defense industrial projects, but al-
so for the strategic aim of maintaining a truly Euro-
pean defense industrial base. Any other option would 
leave both countries worse off. 
However, it is not enough for Berlin and Paris to 
agree in principle on the need for more cooperation. 
Cooperation is difficult, and so far, Germany and 
France are lacking a key factor for success: a shared 
assessment of the interests involved and the exist-
ing problems, and an agreement on the way forward. 
These shortcomings are the reason why much-need-
ed progress on real projects has been blocked.
A shared assessment implies first of all that all stake-
holders share, discuss, and are willing to refine and 
revise existing concepts and modes of operation. Be-
tween Germany and France, there is no lack of for-
mats and opportunities for exchange. But there is no 
follow-through, and the pretty words agreed by both 
countries don’t lead to an improvement of the day-
to-day running of cooperation projects.
In brief, it is Germany and France that need to fill 
their cooperation with life. This won’t happen from 
the outside; only the two countries themselves can 
make it happen. But if and when it does, this coop-
eration will transform France, Germany, and Europe 
as a whole. 
and European strategic autonomy is concerned. This 
may be coupled with a misperception or wrong per-
ception of the relationship between the French gov-
ernment and French defense industry. At least both 
sides agree on the issue area: The concept of defense 
industrial policy is different on the other side – but 
the problem is not so much the difference per se, but 
the different expectations each side has of the oth-
er’s concept. Actors may not be aware of their own 
misperception.
Both missing perception and misperception imply 
that Germany and France are talking at cross pur-
poses because they are not aware about a point 
made by the other side. This can lead to mistrust and 
frustration.
The third area concerns issues where one side poses 
open questions that need to be clarified by the oth-
er side. The French side, for instance, is wondering 
whether a capability development system exists in 
Germany with as similar scope as in France, and who 
the main actors and the key procedures are. In this 
case, the missing perception or knowledge has been 
made transparent and can be rectified more easily.
The traffic lights used in the mapping below indi-
cate the level of challenges we see in solving the per-
ceived problems:
Greenlights/Consent: A consensus about prob-
lems and an idea about a potential way forward exist. 
The stakeholders can build on mutual understand-
ing which relies on common objectives and on the 
fields in which, even if France and Germany disagree, 
they share the same analysis of the causes of these 
disagreements. Options for solutions can be dis-
cussed and evaluated. Yet stakeholders have to ac-
tively work on keeping consensus alive through con-
tinuous activity.
Yellow lights/Dissent: Actors share the problem 
perception but diverge over the solution. Dissent is 
a problem, but in this category, German and French 
stakeholders have the same language, and there are 
few misperceptions. Dialogue can continue, but solu-
tions can only be based on a balanced compromise.
Red lights /Mis(sing) perceptions: There is no 
shared problem perception. Problem awareness and 
common problem definition need to be established 
first. There is a need to explain the stakeholders’ re-
spective national practices and meanings and ex-
plore problem perceptions. Constant or repeated ex-
planations may be needed. Action has to be in line 
with explanations to prevail against ambiguities that 
can lead to distrust. This offers the opportunity to 
open up more solutions, but it also entails the risk 
of additional problems. But these may have existed 
anyway. 
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Areas of Mis(sing) perceptions: Explain national practices and meanings to the stakeholder and 
explore problem perceptions. Constant or repeated explanations may be needed. Action has to 
be in line with explanations to work against ambiguities that can lead to distrust.
Areas of Dissent:  Work on balanced and sustainable compromise
.
Areas of consent: Actively keep consensus alive - it is not a given.
Source: Authors own elaboration.
Tabelle 1: Consent, dissent and mis(sing) perceptions: the problem landscape  
of Franco-German defense industrial cooperation
Consent Dissent Mis(sing) 
persception 
(by whom)
POLITICAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Reasons and potentials to cooperate
Low German profile on international security and defense in France 
Threat perceptions that drive capability demand
Requirements and specifications for equipment
The way capabilities are defined and those definitions transferred into procurement
Need to clarify the level of commonality of operational requirements
Assessment on the limitations that result from German procurement standards,  
regulations, and procedures.
No important role of CFADS German actors
German capability development and procurement process French actors
DEFENSE EXPORT REGULATIONS
A German defense exports policy is missing
“German free” will hamper defense industrial cooperation and export and help  
competitors
Impact of defense exports on French SME linked to German prime contractors German actors 
European defense export regulations could help Franco-German cooperation  
and vice versa
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL POLICY
French willingness to give up or pool industrial competences in order to consolidate 
the sector German actors
Political guidance for the future Franco-German DTIB German actors
French self-perception on their national export control as strong German actors 
Strong French defense industrial policy 
Implications of “strategic autonomy” German actors
Defense industrial (policy) objectives that can be shared among German and  
French actors
French superiority in defining capabilities, managing procurement projects,  
and controlling technologies German actors 
German feeling of inferiority vis-a-vis the French industry due to the support  
by the French government French actors
Past cooperation may not have favored German industry Partly
Current cooperation is to the detriment of France German actors
German defense industrial policy could lead to renationalization instead of  
Franco-German cooperation German actors
Germany lacks a defense industrial rationale and a related policy French actors
Low priority & slow action on defense industrial issues by the German government French actors
German reading of past industrial consolidation French actors
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THE WAY FORWARD
The objective of this paper is to raise awareness in 
particular of those problems that may be below the 
radar or that are too sensitive to be touched upon by 
officials and stakeholders. 
We can therefore only provide a rough sketch of the 
way forward. The underlying assumption of the pa-
per and its overall approach is that, as in coopera-
tion in general, stakeholders have to ultimately de-
fine the problems, prioritize them, and agree on the 
ways they want to work on solutions. 
Hence, our recommendations especially take into ac-
count the stage of problem definition and the poten-
tial next steps that may lead to solutions. We do not 
propose specific policies. At a later stage, it will be 
useful to evaluate options for solutions with respect 
to their probability of success, based on experiences 
from the past and available alternatives. 
What can France contribute to solving the prob-
lems?
Regarding the political framework of defense indus-
trial activities, France should explain and detail the 
role of state shareholding in defense companies and 
clarify the links and the respective role of national 
strategic autonomy and European strategic autono-
my. It could be beneficial if France were to lay down 
its defense industrial strategy in a public document.
Moreover, France could present the lessons learned 
and best practices of Franco-British cooperation: 
talks and coordination on R&T with the High-level 
Working Group (HLWG) and common defense indus-
trial policy in missile sectors.
What can Germany contribute to solving the prob-
lems? 
German officials from industry and government dif-
fer on which of the blocking factors and problems 
have a structural quality: Would the whole system 
need to change, or just specific actors and policies? 
However, it should be possible to identify the room 
for maneuver more precisely. This is urgently needed 
to put the envisaged cooperation on a solid footing at 
the political and the industrial level. This is especial-
ly true for the German defense export policy. Even if 
there is still time until the first exports from future 
Franco-German cooperation projects take place, the 
issue has become a symbol and thus has acquired a 
life of its own. Germany will be judged on its han-
dling of this topic not only by France but by other 
partners, too. 
Germany could start contributing more certainty by 
developing a national armament and defense indus-
trial strategy that would also provide the basis for fu-
ture practices in procurement and defense industrial 
aspects of decision making. The next step however – 
implementing this strategy – would be more difficult 
as it would imply changes to the system.
From a German point of view, successful industrial 
cooperation – and as a consequence, consolidation 
– would depend on marginalizing the de facto role of 
the French state in defense industries.
Actions both countries can take jointly
France and Germany have not actively been looking 
for areas of commonality before embarking on new 
cooperation projects. Yet it would be crucial to iden-
tify and leverage on these areas.
An option to overcome the gap could be a joint ap-
proach to armament, procurement, and defense in-
dustry. The July 2017 joint declaration did not set out 
a common armament strategy as such but hinted 
at shared capability aims and the will to implement 
them jointly. It is important to progress and reach 
convergence on (some) capability targets in the me-
dium and long term. Yet no capability or armament 
strategy is truly sustainable or realistic without 
shared strategic analysis and missions.
France and Germany could develop documents on 
their national defense industrial policy based on 
the same grid of questions. A first step in this direc-
tion was taken by the German 2015 Strategy Paper 
on Strengthening the Defense Industry in Germa-
ny,  and France’s 2017 Defense and National Securi-
ty Strategic Review , which were meant to be com-
parable in many areas. These two documents provide 
the starting point for a process of drafting a joint 
strategy. 
France and Germany should also initiate one or sev-
eral short-term programs. The experience gained 
with such short-term programs would contribute to 
the successful implementation of the next genera-
tion of larger programs. For now, both sides still have 
some knowledge especially about the early phases 
of projects, but this may soon be largely lost, as the 
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timespan between the early phases of the last proj-
ects and those of the next large projects can be mea-
sured in decades.
Misperceptions based on prejudices are immediate 
stumbling blocks in the implementation of any new 
initiatives in Franco-German defense cooperation. 
This is especially true for the defense industrial side.
The debate on defense and the defense industry is 
about missing perceptions that leave room for the 
stereotypes repeated by generations of military, in-
dustrial, and political actors. Today, virtually every-
one on both sides of the Rhine can recount a bad ex-
perience with a counterpart from the other side of 
the river – even if this was not a personal experi-
ence. All too often, the debate is limited to reproduc-
ing clichés.
To go beyond such a debate, Paris and Berlin should 
use two complementary avenues: 
1. To increase understanding, a Franco-German 
group should engage “cross-strategizing” on de-
fense industrial affairs: The French should ex-
plain the German defense industrial sector to 
their counterparts, and the Germans should 
explain the French sector to their French col-
leagues. This would include suggesting best 
strategies and necessary changes. The goal is to 
open perceptions to debate and increase mutu-
al understanding without annoying or lecturing 
the counterparts.
2. To increase the knowledge base and overcome 
cherished but biased assumptions, political and 
industrial decision-makers should consider the 
facts, figures, and forecasts for both countries’ 
industrial complexes. This should include look-
ing at strengths, weaknesses, cooperation op-
tions, and market perspectives, based on an in-
dependent external analysis.
Only through cooperation will Germany and France 
be able to effectively pursue their interests. This is 
true for specific defense industrial projects, but al-
so for the strategic aim of maintaining a truly Euro-
pean defense industrial base. Any other option would 
leave both countries worse off. 
However, it is not enough for Berlin and Paris to 
agree in principle on the need for more cooperation. 
Cooperation is difficult, and so far, Germany and 
France are lacking a key factor for success: a shared 
assessment of the interests involved and the exist-
ing problems, and an agreement on the way forward. 
These shortcomings are the reason why much-need-
ed progress on real projects has been blocked.
A shared assessment implies first of all that all stake-
holders share, discuss, and are willing to refine and 
revise existing concepts and modes of operation. Be-
tween Germany and France, there is no lack of for-
mats and opportunities for exchange. But there is no 
follow-through, and the pretty words agreed by both 
countries don’t lead to an improvement of the day-
to-day running of cooperation projects.
In brief, it is Germany and France that need to fill 
their cooperation with life. This won’t happen from 
the outside; only the two countries themselves can 
make it happen. But if and when it does, this coop-
eration will transform France, Germany, and Europe 
as a whole. 
A shared assessment implies 
that all stakeholders are will-
ing to refine existing concepts 
and modes of operation.
Rauchstraße 17/18 
10787 Berlin
Tel. +49 (0)30 25 42 31 -10
info@dgap.org 
www.dgap.org 
 @dgapev
The German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful 
foreign and security policy on a German and 
European level that promotes democracy, 
peace, and the rule of law. It is  nonpartisan 
and nonprofit. The opinions expressed in 
this publication are those of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP)
Publisher 
German Council on Foreign Relations
ISSN 1611-7034
Editing Bettina Vestring
Layout Wiebke Ewering
Design Concept: WeDo
Author picture(s) © DGAP, Iris
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
 Attribution – NonCommercial – NoDerivatives 4.0 
 International License.
